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Plaintiff/Appellant Vickie L. Collins ("Collins"), by her counsel of record, Brian
S. King, and Richard R. Burke of King & Isaacson, P.C., hereby reply to
Defendant/Appellee's ("the Center's") brief:
I

THIS COURT MUST REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DIRECTED VERDICT BECAUSE COLLINS PRESENTED
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE CENTER'S NEGLIGENCE,

The undisputed facts show that Collins presented competent evidence of the
Center's negligence. Collins had the burden to present a prima facie claim of
negligence. If Collins presented competent evidence of the Center's negligence, the trial
court erred in granting the Center's directed verdict. Merino v. Albertson's, Inc.. 975
P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999), reh'g denied (April 14, 1999). This Court must reverse the
trial court because Collins sustained her burden of demonstrating the Center's negligence.
The undisputed facts show that the Center owed Collins a duty to reasonably
protect her, in light of her increased seizures, and recent seizure fall injury. The Center's
duty arose from Collins' IHP, the Center's Client Safety Policy, the Center's Seizure - No
Swimming Policy, and the Center's twenty-eight years of comprehensive care for Collins
individual needs. Aplt. Brief at 13-14. The Center undertook seizure safety measures
for Collins during her years at the Center, including requiring Collins to wear a helmet
and preventing Collins from swinging when she was actively seizuring. App. Brief at 15.
Collins presented competent evidence that the Center had a duty to reasonably protect her
from injuries in connection with her seizures.

The undisputed facts show that the Center breached its duty to Collins. It is selfevident that the Center breached its duty to protect Collins, especially given Collins'
profound disabilities. The Center does not dispute that it failed to consider that Collins
might seizure and fall from her swing. Aplt. Brief, at 16, Facts f 26. The staff had
already recognized that Collins5 elevated seizure activity increased her risk of injury, and
required her to wear a helmet. Aplt. Brief at 15, Facts If 21. Even though Collins
continued to seizure, no staff considered the possible injuries to Collins if she were
permitted to swing, and fell from a significant height. Id. at 16, Factsffif24 and 26.
Although the Center had previously prevented Collins from swinging when her seizure
activity was high, the Center did not modify (or even think of modifying) any of Collins'
recreational activities to take into account her increased scope of seizure fall injuries. Id.
at page 15, Facts f 22, and at page 16, Facts f 26. Utah law does not require expert
testimony where jurors need no assistance to understand the evidence. See, e.g.. Nixdorf
v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) (no expert testimony required when propriety
of the treatment received is within common knowledge of laymen). The facts show that
the Center breached its duty to reasonably protect Collins.
To summarize, the trial court erred when it granted the Center's directed verdict
because Collins presented competent evidence of the Center's duty to Collins and its
breach of that duty. No expert testimony was required because jurors could understand
the Center's duty to reasonably take into account Collins' needs and appropriately limit
2

her activities. The Center's failure to consider the likelihood of serious injury to Collins
by letting her swing in her condition demonstrated its breach of duty to Collins, and
required no expert testimony for jurors to understand. Collins also presented undisputed
evidence of causation and damages. This Court reviews the facts in the light most
favorable to Collins, and because Collins made out her prima facie case of negligence,
this Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict.

II

THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT DOES NOT
REQUIRE EXPERT TESTIMONY.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("The Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3
(Supp. 1998), does not require expert testimony to state a cause of action. The Center
argues that any and all claims falling under the Act require expert testimony. Aple. Brief
at 10-13. The language of the Act, however, belies the Center's argument. The Act
contains no expert testimony requirement. It makes no distinction among contract, tort,
breach of warranty, or other claims: they are all "malpractice" actions for the purpose of
applying the requirements of the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14). To the contrary,
the separate listing of claims, shows that the designation of, for example, a contract claim
as a "malpractice" action for the purposes of the Act does not change the underlying
character of the claim. Put another way, a plaintiff with a contract claim that falls under
the Act must still demonstrate the elements of offer, acceptance and consideration, even if
the Act deems it a "malpractice" action. The mere designation as a "malpractice" action

3

does not mandate expert testimony. To require expert testimony for every claim arising
under the Act would radically alter the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules
of Evidence in ways that the legislature surely did not intend. The Center's position that
expert testimony is required of all actions encompassed under the Act is untenable.
The problems and consequences of the Center's position are well demonstrated in
Collins' case. While the trial court admitted that Collins' case was not a classic medical
malpractice case, it failed to recognize that under the facts of this case, this distinction
eliminated the need for expert testimony in the issues of duty and breach. This is because
there is a difference between classic medical malpractice cases, and actions that arise
under the Act (hereinafter: "statutory medical malpractice actions"). Classic medical
malpractice cases generally involve a breach of the duty of a medical professional owed
to a tort victim, while statutory medical malpractice can include any actions, even
contract and breach of warranty actions. The failure to distinguish between a statutory
medical malpractice claim, and a classic medical malpractice claim is critical: the latter
generally require expert testimony, see e.g..Chadwick v. Nielson. 763 P.2d 817, 821 n.4
(Utah Ct. App. !988) (holding that standard of care must be established by expert medical
testimony to present prima facie medical malpractice case involving doctor negligence);
statutory malpractice claims may not need expert testimony to make out a prima facie
case. The Center's argument simply abandons this critical analysis, as the trial court did
in this case.
4

In this case, the trial court concluded that specialized care was involved but failed
to explain what specific specialized care was at issue. This was especially vexing
because it was undisputed that no staff considered restricting Collins9 swinging in light of
her seizures. Even assuming, arguendo, that specialized care was involved, as a threshold
matter, the Center failed to consider how the specialized care should be used to protect
Collins during her increased seizure activity. Regardless of the level of specialized care
that might have been required to assess the risk of seizure injury to Collins, the
responsible parties or institution must first identify the risk. Consequently, even
assuming the breach of a specific professional was alleged - - which it was not - - the
facts show that no staff ever considered restricting Collins' swinging in connection with
her seizures. The Center committed a sin of omission by failing to take the first step to
reasonably protect Collins - identifying the risk of serious injury if she seizured while
swinging. There was simply no need for expert testimony under these facts.
In this case, the trial court concluded that expert testimony was required but failed
to explain why or what care was implicated. Appellant named only the facility as a
whole and never alleged negligence on the part of any specific individual. Similarly, the
facts show that the duty to protect Collins ran to the facility as a whole. See, e.g.. Client
Safety Policy; Seizure - No Swimming List; and IHP for Vickie L. Collins. The Center's
position would permit other trial courts to abandon their analysis of the duty of care owed
to tort victims. This Court must reject the Center's position because it is unwarranted by
5

statute, conflicts with established Utah precedent concerning the use of expert testimony,
and would introduce confusion and barriers to plaintiff in simple negligence actions, such
as Collins.'
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO QUALIFY DR. MUSTARD AS AN EXPERT
WITNESS.

The trial court abused its discretion when it prevented Dr. Mustard from testifying
as to the standard of care. As a threshold matter, the trial court abuses its discretion when
it is based on a misapplication of law. The trial court based its exclusion of Dr. Mustard
on its mistaken belief that risk management was not at issue in Collins' case.1 Dr.
Mustard was prepared to testify as to risk management that applied to facilities like the
Center. The Center does not dispute that Dr. Mustard was qualified to testify in this area
of his expertise. Instead, it argues that Dr. Mustard was not qualified because he holds
different credentials than Collins' caregivers. While this argument assumes that
appropriate care was provided to Collins, it is undisputed that NO STAFF MEMBER
CONSIDERED MODIFYING COLLINS' SWINGING IN CONNECTION WITH HER
INCREASED SEIZURE ACTIVITY. The Center can not make distinctions about the

1

As illustrated in Appellant's brief, the trial court's failure to explain what care it
believed was at issue confounds any attempt to make sense of its actions. Given that the trial
court granted Collins' motion in limine because the Center failed to consider modifying Collins'
swinging in connection with her seizures, one may well ask why any expert testimony was
required to show that the entire Center failed to act. That said, ifriskmanagement was not at
issue in Collins' case, what "specialized care" was instead at issue?
6

qualifications between Dr. Mustard and the Center's staff members, where no staff
member acted to reasonably protect Collins.2 Where the entire facility failed to consider
the risks to Collins of swinging in an open swings in her condition, Collins put risk
management squarely at issue. This Court should find that the trial court abused its
discretion when it refused to permit Dr. Mustard to testify.
IV

THIS COURT MUST CONSIDER COLLINS' SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP CLAIM BECAUSE IT WAS SUBSUMED IN HER
NEGLIGENCE ACTION, AND ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL
COURT'S PLAIN ERROR / EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFY THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP.

Collins' special duty argument was subsumed in her negligence action. The
special relationship outlined in Collins' brief is not a separate cause of action.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4). Instead, it is one of many factual scenarios
upon which a tort victim in a negligence action can establish a duty of care owed by the
tort feasors. Collins established the facts that gave rise to the special relationship claim
before the trial court. See Appt. Brief at 13-14, ^ 8, 10, and 17, and discussion at 30-33.
Collins was precluded, however, from telling the jury in closing argument that they could
find a special relationship between Collins and the Center based on the facts presented at
trial. Consequently, the trial court's grant of directed verdict denied Collins the right to
present her case to the jury.
2

This further supports the conclusion that no expert testimony was required to
show a breach of the standard of care under Collins' facts.
7

Like all duties in negligence cases, the duty contemplated by a "special
relationship" between two parties is established by facts. The Center's special
relationship to Collins is not a new issue. Instead, the facts show that for twenty eight
years, the Center provided comprehensive care for Collins, and selected her activity
choices, taking into account her severe mental retardation, schizophrenia, and other
limitations. The conclusion that the Center owed Collins the affirmative duty to
reasonably protect her follows from these facts. The Center may not ignore the
undisputed facts in Collins' negligence action, and claim that Collins has raised new
issues. The Center's argument simply has no application to Collins' case, and should be
ignored.
Alternatively, the trial court's plain error and/or exceptional circumstances
warrants review of Collins' special relationship claim on appeal.
Under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this court may take notice of
"plain error" that affects the party's "substantial rights." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,
853 (Utah 1992). This case meets the plain error requirements: 1) an error exists - the
Court's grant of directed verdict which took the case from the jury ; 2) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court - Collins pointed out the trial court's error before it
granted the directed verdict; and 3) the error is harmful - Collins was prevented from
putting her negligence case before the jury. State v. Dunn, 850 1201, 1208-09 (Utah
1993).
8

Exceptional circumstances also warrant review of Collins' special relationship by
this Court. The concept of exceptional circumstances has been described as "elusive"
and "ill-defined," and has decided on a case-by-case basis. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209, n.3.3
Collins' case presents compelling facts that warrant invoking the exceptional
circumstances doctrine. Collins' negligence case raise very fact-specific questions of
duty and breach, which typically are determined by the jury as the trier of fact. The trial
court's directing of a verdict for the Center precluded the fact finder's deliberations.
These are exceptional circumstances that warrant this Court's consideration of Collins
special relationship with the Center.
This Court should properly consider Collins' special relationship with the Center
because it was plainly subsumed in her negligence action, and Collins presented the
requisite facts to claim this relationship to the Center. Alternatively, this Court should
consider Collins' special relationship to the Center because of the trial court's plain error,
exceptional circumstances, and to do substantial justice.

3

For a good review of cases discussing the exceptional circumstances doctrine, see
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

9

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of
directed verdict, and remand this case. Collins made out a prima facie case of negligence,
and this Court must review the facts in a light most favorable to Collins. The trial court
erred in holding expert testimony was required because jurors could understand the
Center's duty and breachfromthe testimony of the witnesses and documents admitted
into evidence at trial. The trial court abused its discretion because it committed legal
error, or alternatively abused its discretion when it refused to permit Dr. Mustard to
testify about applicable risk management standards. Finally, Collins' special relationship
argument is subsumed in her negligence action, and is not a separate cause of action, and
should be considered by this Court. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial
court, and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 25th day of May, 1999.
KING & ISAACSON, P.C.

Brian S. King
Richard R. Burke

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 3-1? day of May, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF, first class mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Nancy Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
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